North Korea and the Nuclear Solution

A shallow underground nuclear test

When the United States invaded Iraq, the explanation that the Bush administration gave to the world is that they were a hostile power that possessed weapons of mass destruction, which could eventually be used against the United States or its allies. As President George W. Bush said in a speech in 2002 in Cincinnati,

"[Iraq] is seeking nuclear weapons. It has given shelter and support to terrorism and practices terror against its own people. The entire world has witnessed Iraq's 11-year history of defiance, deception and bad faith... Some ask how urgent this danger is to America and the world. The danger is already significant, and it only grows worse with time."

As it only became clear in the aftermath of the American invasion of Iraq, these words were not true. By 2003, Iraq did not possess weapons of mass destruction, biological, chemical or nuclear. However, what strikes me is to see how true these same words are of North Korea today.

If anything, the case is worse: Kim Jong-Il's dictatorship is not seeking nuclear weapons; it already has them, as they reminded the world earlier today. They also have shown their willingness, if not their full capacity, of launching rockets into the atmosphere -of the same kind as those that can hold nuclear weapons. The rhetoric coming from the country's leadership could not be more inflammatory, having scrapped in January all agreements they had with South Korea since 1991 to lower military tension. In addition, after the United Nations Security Council condemned North Korea's failed missile test last month, North Korea demanded an apology, expelled all nuclear inspectors and affirmed that any sanctions against it following their missile test would be considered a "declaration of war".

The danger is already significant, and it only grows with time.

Political and military leaders in Seoul and Tokyo are having meetings about what to do in the face of this new, second North Korean nuclear test. Although, reportedly, the nuclear device North Korea detonated underground was fairly small (a "fraction" of the atomic bombs the US used against Hiroshima and Nagasaki, says CNN), the situation is very worrying. Japan and South Korea would be the two countries most likely to receive a nuclear attack by the North, if that ever came to happen. But then, of course, nuclear weapons being much more effective as elements of deterrence, it is more than questionable whether North Korea would ever dare strike first with a nuclear device. Even more, consensus is that North Korea has not yet reached the technological capacity for creating nuclear weapons that could be fired in ballistic missiles.

Yet, that is not the point. Whether North Korea plans to use its "possibly one or two", definitely "less than 10", nuclear weapons (according to The Economist) against South Korea, Japan or America must not be the focus of the discussion. The theory of nuclear deterrence and its possible applications to the North Korean case also goes beyond the problem at hand. The crux of the situation is that North Korea will use this latest test to do the same thing it has always done with its few nukes: blackmail its Southern neighbor and the West. And the North's strategy will only have worked if they are rewarded for their misbehavior.

It seems that every American attempt to deal with North Korea has failed. Negotiations have been going on and off since 1994, and there has been little success, needless to say. Including North Korea in the "axis of evil", isolating the country, and using economic sanctions, as during the Bush administration, also failed. Typically, North Korea has toned down its rhetoric and seemed more willing to behave when they have been offered oil or money in exchange, as it happened in 2007. But typically, as well, every 'deal' there is with North Korea is followed by yet another advance in the country's race to become a full-fledged nuclear power.

They must be stopped. A functional nuclear weapon in the hands of an unpredictable regime led by a senile man and a ruthless military elite is not in anyone's best interest. The North Korean leadership will have an incentive to continue to advance their nuclear program, and conduct more provocative tests, as long as they keep receiving the world's attention and nothing else than a slap in the wrist in exchange. The problem is that there is little that can be done. An invasion of the country is completely out of the question: if there is anything in which North Korea excels it is military power, with its 1 million strong army. Tougher economic (i.e., trade) sanctions risk radicalizing the dictatorship even more, and they would probably affect ordinary North Koreans the most -and their government cannot be trusted to care much for their livelihoods.

Perhaps, the least painful option would be to apply targeted financial freezes against the assets of the North Korean state in foreign banks, while at the same time, signaling that the door to the Six Party Talks is still open. A travel ban on all members of the North Korean government, including the members of Kim Jong-Il's family, could also be part of the mix. But this seems too soft to me. Would further talks six months or a year from now, produce any tangible results? In 2008 it seemed that the North Koreans had finally agreed to dismantle their nuclear program, only to see it reemerge fantastically this year. Moreover, paying radical, nuclear-wannabe states so that they halt their weapon programs sets a terrible precedent on the international stage.

In this case, the "nuclear solution" could be, literally, the nuclear solution: giving a nuclear bomb to South Korea, more likely than not, would be the only way to make the North Koreans shut up, sit on the table, and have some serious negotiations. As a matter of fact, South Korea had the intent to develop nuclear weapons before 1975 (and it probably had a clandestine program well into the 1980s), when it acceded to dismantle its nuclear program under pressure from the United States. South Korea is now a signatory of the Non Proliferation Treaty, and it uses nuclear power for peaceful purposes only. Nonetheless, letting South Korea join the nuclear club now could be the only thing that will make the North want to negotiate -then, the goal to which both countries would aim would be the dismantlement of both their nuclear programs. The difference is that in those negotiations, the two countries would have the same things at stake, thus leveling the field and reducing North Korea's bargaining power, which at present is superior to the South's. It could also be the only way in which the West may succeed in its efforts to neutralize the most horrible dictatorship on the planet.

Yet, of course, this very dangerous solution could backfire. A nuclear South Korea would just make the North Koreans double their efforts to achieve full nuclear capability. And although deterrence theory has it that two nuclear countries are not expected to go to war with one another (guess why), many would say the risk is just too great to take. Certainly, China would also object loudly to having a replica of the Cold War world just next to its shores, and there would also be much opposition from Europe, the UN and other members of the international community. The move could also spark an arms race in Asia, leading other nations (Taiwan?) to pursue their own nuclear ambitions. Last but not least, it is extremely unlikely that this would be a solution that could please the Obama administration, or the American public. In one word, it is impractical.

Yet, for all its flaws, this same scenario worked during the Cold War: the reason why the USSR and the USA did not resort to direct conflict with each other for almost 40 years was the certainty that the enemy had the capability to destroy one's country entirely. The same logic has kept India and Pakistan from fighting another war, albeit in a tense and imperfect peace. And although North Korea's nuclear program is still too incipient to demand the radical solution of arming the South, this may be the only option that could stop the North from continuing to use its nukes for blackmail.

Nevertheless, in the world of practical solutions, financial and economic sanctions, travel bans, and the hope that Kim's thugs rejoin negotiations seem to be the only options on our menu.

¿Uribe contra la República?

En su edición del 17 de mayo, la revista The Economist acertó al decir que el Presidente Álvaro Uribe se "desliza hacia la autocracia". La propuesta del referendo que podría permitirle una segunda reelección a Uribe está en sus horas decisivas en el Congreso de la República.

La semana pasada las cosas llegaron a calentarse en el último debate sobre el tema en el Senado, porque los partidos de oposición, desalentados ante el apabullante dominio de la mayoría uribista, decidieron salir del recinto. Hubo acusaciones de que Fabio Valencia Cossio, Ministro del Interior y de Justicia, estaba ofreciendo prebendas a cambio de los votos de Convergencia Ciudadana, un partido minoritario. El Ministro defendió su actuar y negó cualquier intento de compra de votos.

Ahora queda la conciliación de dos versiones de la pregunta del referendo: una aprobada en la Cámara de Representantes, que le permitiría al Presidente lanzarse como candidato en el 2014 y no en el 2010, y la del Senado para aprobar la reelección en las elecciones de 2010. El meollo del asunto es que parte de la responsabilidad de la conciliación le corresponde a Germán Varón, Presidente de la Cámara de Representantes, y fiel partidario de Germán Vargas Lleras, un posible candidato presidencial. Así pues, es probable que Varón promueva la versión que le permite al Presidente lanzarse en 2014 y no en 2010. Ante esta posibilidad, los uribistas puros y duros han decidido obstaculizar las acciones de Varón: el Partido de la U, epicentro de la política uribista, ha hecho que la Comisión de Ética de la Cámara estudie si Varón puede o no intervenir en el proceso de conciliación.

Habrá qué ver. Lo que queda claro en todo este asunto es que el meollo difícilmente podría ser más confuso o más perjudicial para los intereses de la nación. Toda la energía política del país está ahora mismo dedicada a tratar el asunto del referendo. Muchos de los que quisieran ser candidatos presidenciales estan en vilo. No saben si lanzar sus candidaturas y después tener que echarlas para atrás ante una posible tercera victoria de Uribe o si esperar a que se defina la situación y arriesgarse a que sea demasiado tarde.

Por su lado, las fuerzas militares están viviendo una de sus crisis internas más importantes en los últimos años, con el escándalo de los falsos positivos, y las FARC parecen estar dando nuevas señales de vida. Pero en Bogotá todo el mundo está ocupado con la suerte del referendo. La economía está de capa caída, y a pesar del optimismo del gobierno, es muy probable que en 2009 el PIB no crezca o incluso que tenga un decrecimiento. El desempleo está por el 13%, y es difícil que la cifra disminuya en el corto plazo. Pero en Bogotá todo el mundo está ocupado con la suerte del referendo.

Y por fin, hace dos días, el hombre que es el origen de toda la tormenta, el Presidente Uribe, se dignó a dar dos palabras sobre su posible segunda reelección. ¡Casi que no! Uribe dijo que le parecía que la reelección era "inconveniente" porque no era bueno perpetuar al presidente. También le preocupa que las próximas generaciones lo vieran como una persona apegada al poder. ¿Será que su respuesta fue a propósito del artículo de The Economist? Al fin y al cabo el foro en el que dio sus declaraciones fue organizado por la revista. ¿Fueron sinceras sus palabras? Si a Uribe le parece tan inconveniente la reelección, ¿por qué permite que su coalición en el Congreso y que su Ministro del Interior trabajen incesantemente para hacer del referendo una realidad? ¿Por qué firmó recientemente un decreto que le permitió a la Cámara de Representantes votar la propuesta del referendo en horas extra? Las palabras de Uribe sólo crean más confusión, aunque, a los que todavía lo admiramos, no dejan de darnos un poco de esperanza de que aun no ha perdido el juicio totalmente.

Y es que el referendo para permitir una segunda reelección es un error por donde se le mire. Un tercer periodo de Uribe traería, a la larga, más problemas que soluciones para Colombia. Hay mil y un motivos creerlo, uno de ellos siendo que el poder político en los Estados Unidos es ahora del partido Demócrata. Un nuevo presidente estaría en una mejor posición que Uribe para renovar las deterioradas relaciones con el gobierno y el Congreso de ese país. Y sin el apoyo de los Estados Unidos no hay manera de salir adelante en la lucha con el narcotráfico ni en el desarrollo económico.

Pero hay otra razón que es mucho más importante: La República estaría muriendo con la segunda reelección del Presidente. El balance de poderes, que de por sí ya tiende a favorecer al ejecutivo, quedaría irremediable e inconteniblemente volcado hacia el beneficio de esa rama sobre las otras dos. De manera inaudita, el cambio constitucional que se haría para permitir que quien haya sido elegido presidente dos veces pueda ser elegido una tercera, sería un cambio constitucional que sólo le aplica al ciudadano Álvaro Uribe Vélez. La ley, universalista por definición, el texto constitucional y fundador de nuestras instituciones políticas estaría siendo alterado para beneficiar únicamente a un colombiano, dado que ningún otro ciudadano vivo ha ejercido la presidencia dos veces. Es el fin de la República y el comienzo de la autocracia. Retumba la verdad de las palabras de The Economist.

Es preocupante que muchos colombianos estén convencidos de que no debe haber obstáculos en la democracia para una mayoría que quiere que su gobernante permanezca en el poder, por encima de los frenos constitucionales. Si el pueblo lo quiere, así debe ser. A esa gente se le olvida que Colombia es una República, donde las decisiones políticas no le son dejadas al pueblo directamente si no a sus representantes elegidos, quienes se adhieren a reglas estrictas del juego político y del límite del poder. La democracia pura, directa, sin obstáculos ni contrapesos, sólo conduce hacia el gobierno de la turba y de las pasiones, así como al final del imperio de la ley.

Fareed Zakaria lo pone magistralmente bien en su libro El Futuro de la Libertad:

"Las fricciones entre el liberalismo constitucional y la democracia se centran en el radio de acción de la autoridad gubernamental. El liberalismo constitucional trata de la limitación del poder; la democracia trata de su ampliación y su empleo. Por ello, muchos liberales de los siglos XVIII y XIX veían la democracia como algo que podía socavar la libertad. La tendencia que muestran los gobiernos de mocráticos a creer que poseen una soberanía absoluta (es decir, un poder absoluto), puede provocar la centralización de la autoridad, a menudo por medios extraconstitucionales y con resultados desalentadores. Al final, acabamos con algo muy parecido a una dictadura, aunque tenga una mayor legitimidad." (Taurus, 2003)

Ojalá el Presidente Uribe se escuche a sí mismo y aplique lo que dijo en el foro de The Economist. Ojalá que el Presidente que salvó a Colombia del terrorismo y el colapso no sea el mismo que la lance al abismo de la autocracia y la personalización del poder. Por la continuidad de las instituciones colombianas, que prevalezca la República.

Sri Lanka and Colombia: Defeating terrorism

The streets of Colombo, Sri Lanka's capital, are full of celebration and victory. Thousands of people took the streets to wave flags, sing, and dance in joy. The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam, a terrorist group that sunk the country into violence and death, have been defeated. Peace is at hand.

The military victory of the Sri Lankan government over the Tamil Tigers is all over the news. President Mahinda Rajapaksa, a hardliner who made it his aim to crush the rebels, had to cut short a trip to Jordan after he got to know that Vellupillai Prabhakaran, the leader of the insurgency had died in the military campaign against him. As he arrived in Colombo's airport, President Rajapaksa kissed the ground. He is happy. His mission has been accomplished.

The Tamil Tigers were created in 1983 in order to fight for a separate homeland for Sri Lanka's Tamil, Hindu minority, which is 3.2 million strong in a country of around 21 million. In their war against the government, they mastered the use of suicide bombs (and especially of female suicide bombers) against civilians and prominent politicians. Ranasinghe Premadasa, a former President of Sri Lanka, and Rajiv Gandhi, a Prime Minister of India, were among their victims, which also include dozens of members of parliaments and cabinet ministers. They even killed prominent Tamils who were critical of their terrorist actions. The New York Times estimates that in the 25 years of existence of the Tamil Tigers, 75,000 people have died in Sri Lanka as a result of the conflict.

In their fight for a Tamil homeland, the Tamil Tigers were absolutely ruthless. The rebels they recruited were taught that they had to avoid capture by taking the cyanide capsules they carried around their necks. Their violent ways, their attacks against military convoys, civilian buses, big cities and small towns, caused nothing but terror and despair.

In 2002, a negotiation process between the Tigers and the government, mediated by Norway, failed to produce any results. There was a ceasefire, "prisoners of war" were exchanged, a 'Memorandum of Understanding' was signed... but peace did not come. The fighting resumed in 2005, because agreement over the basic issue, an independent state for the Tamil minority, was not arrived at. After more sporadic talks while confrontation between the parties still went on, President Rajapaksa, elected in 2005, decided to declare the ceasefire agreement null and void in 2008. He then started a military campaign against the Tigers in order to get them out of the vast territories they controlled around the country. That military campaign has has ended today in victory for the Sri Lankan state and the military annihilation of the terrorist group.

I can only think of the many parallels that President Rajapaksa's fight against the Tamils has with President Uribe's campaign against FARC. A Group of rebels who uphold seemingly just causes (an independent homeland and the Tigers, economic redistribution in a very unequal society and the FARC), but who then start to attack civilians indiscriminately and repeatedly; long years of fruitless negotiations between the state and the rebels; a President who wins an election on a platform that terrorism needs to be confronted with military action; a series of successes against the terrorists that creates the collapse of their internal structures and brings the death of their high commanders; a majority of the civilian population that rejoices at the victory of democracy over terror.

Of course, it must be said that the Tamil Tigers are on a much more decrepit state than the FARC. The death of Vellupillai Prabhakaran and the other 25 Tamil Tigers that were with him, including his son, most certainly represents the end of this terrorist group as we know it. Some analysts, nonetheless, note that suicide bombings or other type of attacks against the government could still occur in retaliation, and the Tamil population that sympathized with the Tigers' cause is unlikely to give up all fighting. But the worst is over for Sri Lanka, and the government's victory is both resounding and historical -it represents a fundamental shift in the geopolitical reality of that country: for the first time in decades, the government can say it controls the entire country.

Will the Colombian government be in the same position anytime soon? Everyone says the FARC are close to being extinct, but when will it actually happen? Just last week the FARC were able to kill and ambush several Colombian soldiers in different parts of the country, instilling fears that this may be the start of their comeback. It is also true that for all its similarities with Sri Lanka's conflict, the Colombians have a much tougher war to fight: unlike the FARC, the Tigers never had millions in drug money to buy new weapons and strengthen their position. Moreover, the Colombian government has always had more besides the FARC to worry about (paramilitary groups, common drug lords, other guerrillas... all somehow linked to the drug business).

Finally, I might add, there is a major reason why the Sri Lankan military was able to corner the Tamil Tigers in a way that the Colombian Army would hardly be able to imitate: Sri Lanka is an island. The Tigers could not find refuge behind the borders of neighboring nations, like the FARC do all the time. Behind the Tigers there was nothing but the sea, and not a gang of leftist governments ready to turn a blind eye when the FARC cross to their territories and even willing to provide them with some aid every once in a while. All this makes Colombia's war more complicated, but it also provides us with more reasons why the government needs to be more determined in the fight.

Democracy cannot surrender to terrorism, and least when it comes disguised under the cloak of national liberation, or social justice. These ends ought to be obtained through democratic means and never through massacres, bombings, kidnappings, murder and threats. If anything, what Presidents Rajapaksa and Uribe have shown to the world is that attempts to negotiate with terrorists often lead to the demise of democracy and the rule of law. On the contrary, strong military action in the defense of democratic institutions is the only guarantee there is to make sure that terrorism never wins.

170.000 carros viejos y un concejal inepto

Antonio Sanguino, Concejal de Bogotá

El Polo (anti)Democrático no se detiene en sus esfuerzos constantes por atropellar los derechos de los bogotanos. Ahora resulta que un concejal de Bogotá, Antonio Sanguino, ha presentado un proyecto para obligar a los propietarios de 171.224 vehículos en Bogotá a chatarrizar sus automóviles. ¿La razón? Todos esos vehículos tienen más de 20 años (modelo 1989 o anteriores), y el concejal Sanguino afirma que sacarlos de circulación es necesario para reducir la contaminación y mejorar la movilidad en Bogotá.

¿Pero qué tipo de bestia es este concejal? El proyecto del sr. Sanguino no es una guerra en contra de la contaminación y el tráfico; es un ataque abierto en contra de los más pobres entre los propietarios de vehículos particulares.

En primer lugar, me pregunto si sacar 170.000 de los 1.5 millones de vehículos que tiene la ciudad servirá para mejorar definitivamente la movilidad en el largo plazo. La respuesta es obvia. La solución para mejorar la movilidad no es prohibirle a la gente que monte en carro, sino construir las vías necesarias para que todos los bogotanos, que tienen el derecho de disfrutar de su propiedad, puedan movilizarse por las calles que sus impuestos pagan.

Suponiendo que el proyecto del sr. Sanguino se convierta en ley (Dios lo prohíba), y que todos esos vehículos salgan de circulación, la movilidad en Bogotá seguirá sin mucho cambio: Si se considera que entran más o menos 80.000 vehículos anualmente a la ciudad, en dos años la ciudad estaría tan llena de carros como hoy y el efecto de la ley habría sido casi nulo.

Sobre la contaminación, es cuando menos debatible que estos carros son los que más contaminan y que sacarlos de circulación mejorará sustancialmente la calidad del aire en la ciudad. Los vehículos que más contaminan en la ciudad no son los Renault 4, ni los otros carros viejos que los más pobres entre los propietarios de vehículos usan para el cumplimiento diario de sus quehaceres. Los vehículos que más contaminan en Bogotá son los camiones grandes de carga y las tractomulas que llegan y salen de la ciudad para transportar mercancía (vehículos comerciales de gran tamaño y cilindraje), y los autobuses de servicio público. Mientras la ciudad no tenga una avenida longitudinal que les permita a los camiones de carga transportar su mercancía sin necesidad de entrar a la zona urbana, la movilidad y la contaminación en la ciudad serán grandes problemas.

Pero eso no es lo que el sr. Sanguino quiere que creamos. Según él, su proyecto será la panacea para arreglar la movilidad y la contaminación en Bogotá. Pero terminará poniéndole una carga excesiva a los más pobres entre los propietarios de los vehículos por un beneficio ínfimo. Prohibamos, que así gobernamos, parece el eslogan del Polo Democrático. Ya el alcalde prohibió el uso de todo carro particular por más de 108 días hasta el 2011. Ahora la guerra es contra los más pobres de los propietarios de vehículos particulares, que compraron sus carros con el producto de su dinero, y que en muchos casos, son instrumentos necesarios para sus trabajos.

¿Existe para el Polo algo llamado derecho a la propiedad privada? ¿qué hay del derecho al trabajo?



En la página de El Tiempo está este video que muestra a Adolfo Morales, un propietario de un camión modelo 54 que utiliza para hacer trasteos de viviendas. De eso come. De eso vive. Le gusta trabajar, quiere trabajar, quiere conservar su carro. Pero el Polo quiere quitárselo y volverlo chatarra. Y a cambio, seguramente, le dará el dinero que el vehículo tiene en el mercado y tal vez algo más. En todo caso, ésa será una suma que no se compara con el beneficio monetario que el señor sacaría si se le permite conservar su vehículo, su propiedad, su bien, por el que ha pagado impuestos y que legalmente le pertenece.

Si eso no se una injusticia, realmente yo no sé qué sí lo es.

La guerra idiota contra los taxis ilegales

Vuelve y juega la guerra contra los taxis 'ilegales' en Bogotá. Este video de ELTIEMPO.com denuncia una ruta de taxis 'piratas' que se estacionan en la parada de la calle 72 de Transmilenio y que llevan a sus usuarios por 1000 pesos a cualquier punto del centro financiero de Bogotá. En el lugar, hay un hombre que conduce a los pasajeros hasta los taxis y coordina el servicio, indicándoles a los clientes cuándo hay disponibilidad en los carros.

¿Por qué hay tanta indignación frente a estos vehículos? ¿Cuál es el problema que representan estos taxis? ¿Cuál es el motivo para prohibir su circulación y para impedir que los usuarios los utilicen? La respuesta a estas preguntas sería algo así: Estos taxis probablemente no están registrados como vehículos de servicio público ante las autoridades competentes. Sus tarifas no se acomodan a las que fueron estipuladas por el Distrito (para ser más exactos, son inferiores) y por ende le hacen competencia desleal a los taxistas que sí están registrados y que utilizan el taxímetro para cobrar sus carreras. Asimismo, los taxis piratas, al no cumplir con las normas establecidas por las autoridades, presentan un mayor riesgo para sus pasajeros (¿pagarán SOAT, etc.?), los cuales no están protegidos por la institucionalidad que provee el reconocimiento de una empresa registrada.

Todos esos argumentos son muy debatibles. El servicio que estos taxis prestan involucra a dos partes y a dos partes solamente: el conductor y sus pasajeros. Además, la transacción es absolutamente voluntaria y los beneficia a todos: el conductor se lleva su dinero y los pasajeros arriban a sus lugares de destino, todo por una suma bastante pequeña. Es difícil comprender dónde cabe el distrito en esta intercambio de dineros por un servicio tan básico.

¿Sobre la competencia desleal? Es más desleal y simplemente indefensible que al Distrito se le ocurra sancionar a los dueños de estos vehículos y a sus conductores por el hecho de estar ofreciendo un servicio por menos dinero. ¿O habrá que obligar a la gente a pagar más caro? ¿Es justo defender a los poderosos sindicatos de taxis bogotanos, y a su monopolio en el mercado taxista, monopolio protegido por los controles de precios decretados desde la alcaldía? Los choferes de estos taxis están trabajando honestamente los pocos pesos que ganan -no roban a nadie y no están obligando a sus pasajeros a utilizar sus servicios. Claramente, también están cumpliendo con su cometido de llevar a la gente hasta su lugar de destino, pues si no fuera así, la gente ya habría dejado de usarlos y el negocio no habría crecido. ¿Quién se va a montar en un taxi que se sabe lo va a dejar tirado en cualquier parte?

Finalmente, sobre el tema de la inseguridad en estos taxis, cabe decir que la probabilidad de que uno se accidente en un vehículo pirata o en uno legal es exactamente la misma. Eso depende del nivel del tráfico, del estado de las vías, de la prudencia del conductor y de la prudencia de los demás conductores en la calle.

Sobre el SOAT, hay que resaltar que muchos vehículos vienen con este seguro incluido desde el concesionario. De todas formas, es posible que estos taxis piratas no tengan el SOAT, y supongamos que así es. Claramente, a los usuarios de estos taxis les importa muy poco esta realidad, si es que acaso piensan en ella. Los usuarios, conscientemente o no, toman el riesgo de subirse a estos vehículos a sabiendas de que si hay un accidente de tránsito, ningún SOAT les cubrirá los gastos médicos y serán ellos los que tendrán que sufrir las consecuencias. ¿Quién es el distrito para decirle a la gente que no se puede subir a esos vehículos, máxime cuando quien asume los riesgos es el individuo y solamente el individuo?

Que el Distrito deje trabajar a estos señores y que El Tiempo se ponga a buscar cosas que sí sean noticia. A ver si la ciudad se preocupa por los temas realmente importantes y no en cacerías de brujas que afectan solo a unos pocos hombres que quieren ganar el diario y a otros que solamente intentan llegar a sus trabajos.

The Land of the Free?: Why America's prisons are so crowded

Americans pride themselves on the many freedoms they enjoy. The last sentence of their national anthem praises the star spangled banner that waves "o'er the land of the free and the home of the brave." Their governments, Republican and Democratic alike, constantly (and rightly) remind dictatorships that they should respect free speech and rights of free association, and release political prisoners.

My worldview is indeed very favorable to the United States, and I agree that the US is the greatest promoter and protector of freedom (both economic and political) the world has ever seen.

Yet, the graph above should give us a pause for thought. It is said that America today has a greater share of its population in prison than Stalinist Russia (of course, Stalin's first option was killing his enemies, rather than giving them fair trials in courts of law -in any case, the US has more prisoners per person than today's Russia). Part of the explanation, I believe, is related to the harsh laws on prostitution and drug possession in the United States. I am also of the opinion that the right to bear arms that Americans enjoy (yet another of those precious freedoms) and the consequential higher homicide rate of the US also has an impact on the prison population. With more gun control, homicides would go down, and so would the number of inmates, at least in theory.

Perhaps another reason for these statistics, although a weaker one, is related to more efficient law enforcement and less impunity in the US. I wonder whether Colombia would be so low on the ranking (number 73, out of 171 countries, with 134 prisoners per 100,000 people) if the judicial system were not as inefficient in putting law offenders in jail as it is today.

Votes and Markets: the relation between democracy and development

One of the most hot current debates in political science and economics is about the effect that democracy has on economic development. For decades, many Western scholars boasted that the constraints on executive power and the power dynamics that are associated with democracy increase predictability and lower transaction costs, thus fostering economic growth through time. When kings and dictators are replaced, or at least constrained, by parliaments that are elected fairly and freely, fiscal policy becomes less extractive, expropriation is reduced and public goods (education, health care, roads, etc.) are better allocated and managed. Economists such as Douglas North and Mancur Oslon are proponents of this causal link between democratic institutions and prosperity. The West could feel complacent that it had embraced a form of government that was good both politically and economically.

But then, the Asian tigers and China woke up, showing that democracy was not necessary at all to achieve fast economic growth. Democracy as we know it does not exist in Hong Kong nor Singapore, but their income per capita is well above US$30,000 a year. After decades of starvation and stagnation, China's economy has come today to surpass in size all of Europe's economies, according to some estimates.
Yet, the Communist Party's grip on power remains as tight as usual, with its parliament being nothing more than a rubber stamp organization to the whims of the Party's leaders. These Asian countries bypassed democracy in their roads toward economic progress, and there is no sign that they will embrace democratic institutions anytime soon.

I decided, then, to look for data on democratic institutions. The Economist Intelligence Unit produces every year a Democratic Index, in which they examine the political institutions of 162 countries from 0 (least democratic) to 10 (most democratic). The index assesses the quality of the electoral process, the functioning of government, political participation, political culture, and civil liberties. At first sight, the Democratic Index of the EIU looked like bad news for the proponents of democracy as a promoter of economic prosperity: If democracy were the defining factor for development, Uruguay would be richer than France and Costa Rica and Mauritius would be richer than Italy. However, I decided to go further and see whether there was a positive linear association between the democratic character of political institutions and GDP per capita across countries.

The following graphs show what I found:



The positive correlation between more democratic institutions and economic development is evident. In this graph I am not showing oil producing countries (Saudi Arabia, Oman, Algeria, Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait, Iraq, Iran, etc.) which tend to have low levels of democracy and high levels of GDP per capita. A simple linear regression using Ordinary Least Square estimators tells us that an increase of 1 in the Democratic index of one country (roughly the difference between Latvia and the USA) is expected to increase GDP per capita by 51%. The coefficient is statistically significant at the 99% confidence level.

This positive relation between democracy and development also holds for OECD countries (relatively rich, democratic nations), as the following graph shows.



This means that even for richer, democratic nations, more democracy is also correlated with higher levels of income. Using simple linear regression we estimate that an increase of 1 in the Democratic index of one OECD country (roughly the difference between Italy and Germany) is expected to increase GDP per capita by 54%! This coefficient is also statistically significant at the 99% confidence level.

For Latin American nations, the correlation also holds. There are higher levels of per capita income in countries with better democracies.



Using simple linear regression we estimate that an increase of 1 in the Democratic index of one Latin American country (roughly the difference between Ecuador and Argentina) is expected to increase GDP per capita by 55%. This coefficient is also statistically significant at the 99% confidence level.

This positive relation between the index of democracy and income, however, is much weaker for desperately poor countries. When I graphed the scatter plot using the data points for the 54 countries in my data set with income below US$1500 per year, the slope of the fitted line is much less steep.



Using SLR we estimate that an increase of 1 in the Democratic index of one low income country (roughly the difference between Afghanistan and The Gambia) is expected to increase GDP per capita by a mere 4.4%. This coefficient is not statistically significant, however, and so, it signals that for very poor countries, there is no real association between democracy and income per capita.

What does all this mean? First, that it may well be that economists North and Olson were right: democracy is associated with higher levels of development across countries, although this association is considerably weaker for countries with low levels of income. There comes the problem, then, of convincing poor countries to democratize, when economically it makes little difference. Perhaps this means that what low income countries need first, before democratization, is some economic freedom and investment, accompanied by a strong commitment from the government to protect property rights and capital. After all, that was the road followed by Singapore and Hong Kong, which were very poor in 1950. China also went down that path, obtaining the results we all know about.

Although I think that seeing these associations is very interesting, we must be careful in confusing causation with correlation. Democracy does not cause economic development, and this is not what has been shown here. Rather, the data shows that more democratic countries tend to be richer, or in other words, that democracy and development usually go hand in hand. Even Hong Kong and Singapore get better Democratic Index ratings than many poorer countries (surprisingly, Ecuador and Turkey!). The causality may well go the other way around: it could be development what fosters democracy, or the two factors could be mutually enforcing. Given that democracy is an expensive thing (parliaments, courts, elections, safety nets, etc. cost a lot of money), one may argue that richer countries tend to have better democracies because they can afford to do so.

In any case, we should never forget that democracy is a good in itself, and that related or not to economic development, people should have the right to have a say in how their government manages the affairs of their nation.